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While the classical jurisprudence (fiqh) of Islamic law speaks of ‘four sources’ to the 
Sharīʿa, there are actually only two that refer directly to divine revelation: the Qurʾān 
which was revealed to the prophet Muḥammad, and the Prophet’s statements and acts, 
his sunna, collected and transmitted in a body of normative stories and anecdotes 
called the ḥadīth, or ‘Prophetic traditions’ (Kamali, 1991: 14–228; Vikør, 2005: 31–
88). The Prophet had no supernatural attributes according to standard theology (the 
Sufī mystics would disagree), so there is an issue why his statements beyond those 
that transmit the Qurʾān also represent a divine revelation. One explanation is to claim 
that the Prophet, being the exemplary human, is infallible: he cannot say anything that 
is not correct. However, most views of the Prophet would restrict his attribute to being 
free of sin (maʿṣūm), which preserves him from a conscious lie but not from being 
honestly mistaken. Many ḥadīth stress his human side, providing statements of the 
type, ‘when I speak as a Prophet, you must follow my example, but I have my own 
likes and dislikes as a man, and you need not follow me in that’ (Muslim, ‘Ṣaid’, 7). 
Clearly, such stories are responses to claims that everything the Prophet said and did 
was indeed normative and represented divine will. A more pragmatic explanation is 
that divine revelation was continuous throughout the Prophet’s life. So, if the Prophet 
had inadvertently made a mistake, God would correct him in a later revelation. In the 
absence of such a correction, the Prophet’s statement must thus reflect God’s will. 
However, neither the Qurʾān nor the ḥadīth are limpid sources but in contrasting 
ways. The text of the Qurʾān is not disputed by Muslims but is not always directly 
understandable, and only a small fraction of its verses refer to what may be 
considered legal matters, perhaps around 350 of the 6,200 verses (Kamali, 1991: 19–
20). Thus, human intellectual intervention is required to bring out the legal content or 
actual rules in many of the Qurʾānic verses. Some, however, like some rules of 
marriage, or the ‘Qurʾānic shares’ of inheritance, are direct and practical. 
The ḥadīth are generally more directly applicable: a story will tell of an issue or a 
problem being presented to the Prophet, and he will answer: This is the rule. The 
problem here is that, unlike the Qurʾān, the ḥadīth literature has no clear boundary 
(Brown, 2009: 1–123). The ḥadīth can represent divine revelation if it is true, that is if 
it represents an actual statement or act of the Prophet, but clearly not if it is untrue and 
a later falsification. The ḥadīth were narrated orally from the individual who observed 
the Prophet’s action to one or many listeners, who then repeated the story to their 
audiences, and so on in a chain of at least three or four links before the story was 
written down from the late eighth century onwards, that is at least 150 or 200 years 
after the events they related. Over this time, the number of claimed ḥadith had grown 
to an impossible mass of hundreds of thousands of quite contradictory stories. So, the 
ḥadīth collectors had to devise means to sift this body of texts to discover the 
authentic example of the Prophet. Various methods were used, mostly focusing on the 
transmitters rather than the content of the stories. In this way, the collectors could 
structure their works according to probable level of authenticity from ‘sound’ (ṣaḥīḥ) 
through several levels of ‘probable’ to ‘weak’. However, as the collectors themselves 
were individual scholars without any corporate authority to back them, many 
alternative collections appeared, differing in which ḥadīth they included as ‘sound’. 
Later on, a selection of six to nine works were granted the stamp of ‘orthodoxy’, but 
in particular two, the ‘two sounds’ of al-Bukhārī (d. 870) and Muslim ibn al-Ḥajjāj (d. 
875), were given special status, and it was difficult to argue against a ḥadīth that was 
included in both of these. Beyond them, however, legal discussion would to a large 
degree consist of debates about which ḥadīth outranked the others in authenticity. 
The collectors included ḥadīth in principle solely on the basis of authenticity, and 
they were therefore cumulative in content. Thus, several variants of the same story 
could be included in the same collection if they were all given credit as ‘sound’ in 
transmission. In particular, a ḥadīth could relate an event of the Prophet’s life and his 
rule with the context in which he stated it, juxtaposed to a version that gave just the 
statement of the rule without the context. This could clearly be the basis of later legal 
debates about whether the rule depended on the context or was meant to be 
universally applied. The ḥadīth collectors left those decisions to the legal specialists, 
as their object was not to formulate the law but just to collect what the Prophet and his 
companions had said or done. 
Formulation of the law from the sources 
The two other ‘sources’ (uṣūl) in the classical theory of law were called ijmāʿ and 
qiyās. The former, ‘consensus’, is often legitimized by a ḥadīth from the Prophet: ‘My 
community will not agree on error’ (Ibn Māja, ’Fitan’, 8 and al-Tirmidhī, ’Fitan’, 7 in 
Vikør, 2005: 76–77), meaning that if there was full consensus on an issue in the 
Muslim community, divine will had to be at work (Rahman, 1962; Hasan, 1992). 
Therefore, a view reaching this level of concurrence must in itself be a third form of 
divine revelation and did not need further basis in the Qurʾān or Sunna. However, this 
ḥadīth was considered weak, and the argument contained some logical problems. For 
example, what was meant by ‘my community’ or by ‘consensus’: was it the 
acceptance by the totality of Muslims in the world, learned as well as unschooled? Or 
only those who had competence in law, the scholars? How many Muslims would have 
to disagree for a consensus not to be reached; was a single dissenting voice enough? If 
so, would a sinful Muslim count as the voice that broke the consensus? And further, 
how could one know that a consensus was reached, was a positive statement of 
agreement required, or only the absence of stated disagreement? If the latter, how 
could it be known that there was no such dissenting voice anywhere? How long had 
the community to wait to make sure a dissenter did not appear? Some said one 
generation without dissent after an opinion was made public was sufficient, but in that 
case, why was this generation more important and decisive than the following one? 
In short, the principle of consensus, while generally accepted, could not be very 
productive in legal formulation. The theoretician al-Shāfiʿī summed up that consensus 
as an independent principle was only valid as a way to give a legal basis for self-
evident truths, such that it was necessary to breathe or that the Muslims had to pray 
(Calder, 1983). Otherwise, consensus was only formed around statements and acts 
reported from the Prophet’s early community, and these then already had legitimacy 
in ḥadīth, which for al-Shāfiʿī was the most important source alongside the Qurʾān. 
In practical reality, consensus came to play a completely different role, not as a 
‘source’ for the law alongside and independent from Qurʾān and Sunna, but as a way 
to select which legal rule among several alternatives was to become a ‘positive’ rule, 
that is, the one to be applied. Thus, it came after the procedure of formulating rules 
based on the two recognized sources. This process of rule formulation was called 
ijtihād, ‘effort’. It became known as a ‘fourth source’ of Islamic law under the name 
of its most widespread process, qiyās, or analogical reasoning (Kamali, 1991: 197–
228; Hasan, 1994; Vikør, 2005: 54–74). It involved taking a specific statement or act 
from the Qurʾān or Sunna and expanding it into a general rule by discovering the 
‘effective cause’ (ʿilla) of the original rule. 
The classical example of this process is a Qurʾānic verse that a particular beverage, 
khamr, is the ‘devil’s work’ (Qurʾān, 5:90–1). From this Qurʾānic statement, the act 
of drinking khamr was classified in the category ‘forbidden’. Khamr was a common 
type of wine, but not the only type. So were other similar beverages like nabīdh also 
forbidden? In order to avoid saying vaguely that ‘the one is similar to the other’, the 
jurists developed a methodology to discover, not why God had forbidden khamr, as 
that may be unknowable, but what it was about khamr that caused God to forbid it. In 
this case, the context of the Qurʾānic verse was telling: the verse followed statements 
on other dissolute behaviour like gambling, from which it must be deduced that the 
cause must be the intoxicating nature of khamr which made men act irresponsibly. 
This could then be transferred to other items that had the same effect, and from the 
original statement that khamr is of the devil, we get a general rule that it is forbidden 
to consume any substance that causes intoxication, nabīdh included. 
Not all jurists approved of these procedures, which clearly brought a strong 
element of human intellect into the fashioning of the divine law. The key to the 
process was determining the ʿilla of the source rule, and that was seldom expressed 
directly in the verse or ḥadīth. Many jurists considered that going too far in basing the 
ʿilla, and thus the generalized rule on scholarly deductions weakened its basis on the 
divine will. To accommodate such reservations, limits were placed on the qiyās 
methodologies. Thus, one could for example not build one analogy on another; any 
analogy must be based directly on a text of revelation. Still, many scholars who 
preferred a stricter and more direct connection to the revelation would if possible 
discard qiyās and similar human methodologies altogether. Instead, they lowered the 
level of probability for accepting ḥadīth. Thus, in the case of wine, there was a 
Prophetic saying that stated simply, kull muskir khamr, ‘everything that intoxicates is 
wine’ (Muslim, ‘Ashriba’, 73; Vikør, 2000). Even if that ḥadīth was considered weak, 
less likely to be the Prophet’s expression, a weak ḥadīth was preferable to human 
qiyās. It should be noticed that most often there was agreement on the actual rule: 
drinking all kinds of alcohol was forbidden. The disagreement was about how to 
establish this rule in law. 
Analogy and the discovery of ʿilla was the most productive form of ijtihād. There 
were however others, sometimes known as the ‘subsidiary sources of law’. The most 
important of these were istiḥsān and istiṣlāḥ, both of which meant to avoid a general 
rule in circumstances where it would lead to unjust and unacceptable hardship for the 
believers, under the general Qurʾānic statement, ‘God wants ease for you and not 
hardship’ (Qurʾān, 2:185). Evidently, these rules of exception were also specified and 
delimited in strict methodologies, so as not to give general access to dispense with 
any legal rule one wanted. Other concepts are istiḥṣāb, the principle that in case of 
indeterminacy from other rules, the preferred result is not to change an existing 
situation, and ʿurf, ‘custom’, a term used in different ways (Kamali, 1991: 283–309). 
Here it generally means that the rule should be specified by local circumstances, the 
law could, e.g. require ‘fair rent’, but local custom would decide what ‘fair rent’ was 
in any particular place and time. Such leeway was of course necessary if the law was 
to be practicable in a civilization that spanned centuries and in so widely diverse 
societies as the Muslim empire soon came to be. In fact, while some rules are very 
detailed (such as those of inheritance), others, including much of the penal law, were 
quite vague as to sanctions and left that to the judge’s discretion (taʿzīr), which again 
allowed for easy adaptation to changing social conditions. 
Another process which clearly introduced an element of human reason in 
determining the content of the divine revelation, was the concept of ‘abrogation’ 
(naskh). The issue here was cases where the sources of revelation appear to contradict 
each other. Wine, khamr, is not only mentioned in the verse about it being ‘the devil’s 
work’ but also as a ‘delight’ (Qurʾān, 47:15). Many similar conflicts occur, and the 
scholars had to try to resolve them. One method was to consider each verse to refer to 
a different context, or other ways to ‘unify’ their legal import. But a common solution 
was to say that a later revelation abrogates an earlier one: God revealed His intention 
in steps suitable to the ability of the early believers to follow it. The latest rule is His 
final will. Unfortunately, the Qurʾān is not organized chronologically, so it was up to 
the scholars to determine the order of revelation and thus of priority in such internal 
contradictions. A complex set of concepts of abrogation was established, and there 
were cases where the ‘rule is abrogated, but not the text’ (that is, we can still see the 
earlier, invalid, text in the Qurʾān) and cases where the ‘text is abrogated, but not the 
rule’ (God has effaced from our memory the text of His latest, valid rule, and only the 
earlier, invalid one remains visible). The latter, which seems fairly counter-intuitive, 
was used to explain why the ḥudūd rule of stoning an adulterer is not mentioned in the 
Qurʾān, while the arguably far milder – but legally invalid – punishment of temporary 
house arrest is expressly stated (Qurʾān, 4:15–16). As, according to al-Shāfiʿī, only 
the Qurʾān can abrogate the Qurʾān, there must have been a later Qurʾānic verse that 
abrogates 4:15, and when we cannot find any such now, then it is because God for 
reasons of His own has removed this verse from our memory (Burton, 1990: 122–
164). 
In all, these methodologies of developing a law from the sources of revelation was 
known as the science of uṣūl al-fiqh, the ‘roots of jurisprudence’ as opposed to the 
work on the actual rules, the furūʿ, ‘branches’. However, as this process was 
unmistakeably a human scholarly endeavour and evidently contested by rival scholars 
every step of the way, it could not become actual law (or even non-legal rules of 
behaviour) without a further step of sifting all the various interpretations, analogical 
deductions and claims of ḥadīth authenticity. As the scholars had been successful in 
denying the caliph and state any say in matters of religious science, including that of 
fiqh, they could not look for a caliphal deciding voice; neither did Sunnī Islam 
establish any formal internal religious authority of the type of pope or patriarch. Some 
Shīʿī variants did have such an authority in a living imām (thus most of the Ismāʿīlī 
and Zaydī branches), but even the majority Shīʿī groups, the Imāmīs of Iran, Iraq and 
Lebanon, actually dispensed with that as they believe that last imām went into 
seclusion in the year 874. For the Sunnīs, this is a matter of theology; all humans 
whatever their religious station stand on the same level in relation to God after the 
disappearance of the Prophet. So, no Muslim however schooled can speak in the name 
of God, except by citing His revelation – but not for the interpretation of it when 
contested by other similarly schooled scholars. 
Thus, with no external and no internal fixed authority, the scholars had to settle for 
the principle of consensus – not here the universal ijmāʿ consensus that was a divine 
gift, but the more limited pragmatic consensus of ‘the majority opinion’. They were 
not able to achieve such a full uniformity even within Sunnism, but arrived a part of 
the way towards it in forming four madhhabs, schools of law, each of which was 
supposed to form a consensus within them. To anchor the consensual opinions of the 
schools, they were as far as possible attributed to the eponymous early founders of 
each school: Abū Ḥanifa, Mālik, al-Shāfiʿī and Ibn Ḥanbal: ‘This is what Mālik said 
is the most correct’ (see Chapter 3, this volume). But clearly Mālik did not pronounce 
on every issue that was to be settled, so further concepts such as maʿrūf, the ‘known’ 
or the arjaḥ, ‘the most prevalent, best’ solution came to be ways to define the opinion 
that scholars within the school were supposed to follow. 
The legal literature 
Which opinions and rules were to be applied in this way, was a matter for the 
recognized scholars of law, the fuqahāʾ, to decide. Initially an open field where 
aspiring students flocked around a locally renowned scholar, the transmission of 
knowledge and its authorization came to be focused in colleges, madrasas, where 
students could live off benevolent donations (the same that most scholars depended 
on) and memorize the words of the teacher (Makdisi, 1981; Chamberlain, 1997). 
Such transmission from teacher to student was in the first centuries only oral; the 
student made notes of what the teacher said and memorized it. Thus, the works of 
these early scholars tend to exist in different recensions, riwāyāt, stemming from the 
original notes of different students who varied in what they had written down 
(Muranyi, 1997; Melchert, 1997). From the middle of the tenth century, we begin to 
see greater homogeneity in the transmitted texts, which indicates that teachers now 
began to hand over written texts to their students, leaving less room for individual 
variations in transmission (Schoeler, 2006). The legal discourse was however still 
open; legal works would normally introduce an issue and then present all the different 
views of different scholars on it, maybe with a note of which was preferred by such 
and such authoritative scholar (indicating it was the author’s view). Once these 
conclusions began to be framed in recognized words like ‘the preferred view’, it was 
clear that they constituted what the practitioners of the school were supposed to 
follow. But it was still open to opposing scholars within the school to challenge these 
views if they felt that the discussion in the school provided them with arguments. 
The assumption in the early literature was that those who put the laws into practice, 
the judges, as well as the muftis who framed legal opinions for individual cases, were 
themselves scholars and could navigate the discursive literature to find what was the 
correct conclusion within their madhhab: they were mujtahids, qualified to define the 
law within the methodologies of the schools and the sources of revelation. From the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries onwards, it appears to have been recognized that 
this expectation of scholarly competence was not realistic. Thus, we begin to see a 
different type of legal literature in the schools, ‘abbreviations’ (mukhtaṣar) that 
summed up the school’s view (Fadel, 1996). In these works, a topic was raised and 
the solution given without any argumentation or discussion of variant opinions: in 
such and such a situation, the opinion of our school is that the rule is so and so. Some 
see these mukhtaṣars as the beginning of codification, in the sense of establishing one 
simple and authorized set of rules to be applied. They may indeed be a step on that 
way, but it should be noted that no-one had authorized these scholars to write a 
mukhtaṣar, there could be different such works in circulation for each school, and the 
judge who considered himself competent could freely ignore it for a different opinion 
in the school – and often did so (Fadel, 1996: 233). Nevertheless, the development of 
the mukhtaṣar literature did certainly lead to greater uniformity and homogeneity of 
the law within each of the four schools. 
These simplified works were supplemented by other genres, which could also lead 
to authorization and homogenization. The muftis had, within the limits of their 
scholarly competence, the task to provide legal opinions on disputed questions. 
Originally relevant only for the individual case for which it was issued – fiqh does not 
recognize precedence as a principle – the written opinions (fatwās) of famous muftis 
would be collected and the contextual specificities removed to focus on the legal 
discussion involved (Hallaq, 1996). After two or three rounds of increasing 
abstraction, these fatwā collections would then take the shape of a legal commentary 
of a general nature, which later muftis or other scholars could use in legal arguments. 
Still, the authority of these works resided only in the competence and scholarly 
quality of the mufti who had originally written it, and how that was appreciated by the 
later scholars. 
Natural law, human law and divine law in the Sharīʿa 
The scholars of Islamic law clearly recognized that the formulation of the practiced 
law had a human as well as a divine element. There has however been a discussion 
about how to conceptualize that, in particular what exactly is meant by the terms 
Sharīʿa and fiqh. Briefly, two views can be seen: on the one hand, that the Sharīʿa is 
the divine law that resides with God and only He can truly know: it is God’s rules and 
opinions, which he has for every issue. He has made as much as He wants of His 
Sharīʿa clear to the humans through the revelation. But for humans to understand the 
revelation and practise the divine Sharīʿa, we must use our intellect. That human 
effort, as well as its result, is fiqh. Thus, the Sharīʿa is strictly speaking a body of rules 
that only God can know, and what we have in the mundane world is only fiqh, merely 
an imperfect reflection of the divine Sharīʿa. 
Most often, however, the term Sharīʿa is used for the body of rules that we can see 
and which are practised in this world, while the term fiqh refers to the efforts to 
develop and discuss the law, a science of law, divided into the two fields of legal 
theory, uṣūl, and elaboration of the various branches of the law, furūʿ (Vikør, 2005: 
2). It would seem that the former view, which reserves the term Sharīʿa for the divine 
element of the law, ultimately ungraspable by humans in its totality, is a way to 
protect the term Sharīʿa from the imperfections of the law as hammered out through 
fallible human scholarship, but is also a way to justify an opening for change and 
modernization of the law: what we then change is not the actual divine Sharʿīa but 
merely the human fiqh, which could represent or not represent God’s authentically 
intended rules, since God is silent after the death of His last Prophet Muḥammad and 
has not sanctioned any interpretation over another. So, contesting fiqh is less 
dangerous than contesting the Sharīʿa would be. 
A variant of this view, however, is to delimit the Sharīʿa in another way: There are 
some elements of the law where we do have absolute certainty about the divine will: 
those that directly apply the rules of the Qurʾān. In addition to some elements of 
inheritance rules (the farāʾid, or ‘Qurʾānic shares’) and similar, they are specifically 
the ḥudūd laws against theft, marital infidelity, intoxication and robbery or rebellion. 
These then constitute the core of the actually divine Sharīʿa, or even are the Sharīʿa. 
This view has been promoted by some jihādī groups as arguments for focusing on the 
ḥudud in their campaigns to ‘reintroduce’ the Sharīʿa. However, this view is clearly 
blind to the fact that even those rules were developed through fiqh, and are not at all 
stated unequivocally in the Qurʾān. It was only the fuqahāʾ who, after logical 
discussions, established that these penalties must be thus extrapolated from the 
Qurʾānic text. They are not incontestable; in fact there is not even a full agreement 
about which rules are included among the ḥudūd (some scholars would, e.g. add radd, 
apostasy, while others would exclude intoxication from the ḥudūd). 
In the legal development, the focus was thus on the texts of the revelation, which 
grounded the law in the divine will. An issue of some discussion in the uṣūl al-fiqh 
literature of legal theory, was how to combine this with the human intellectual 
endeavours to formulate a law. In particular, whether human reason could provide a 
separate source or a legal authority beyond direct references to the revelation and 
God’s expressed or indirectly discovered will. That is, whether there is an element of 
natural law in Islamic law. 
Many historians of Islamic law reject this possibility, at least as far as the 
established legal schools are concerned, and state that there is no component of 
natural law in the Sharīʿa. God was the only authority for any legal rule and the only 
one who could determine what was right or wrong, permitted or forbidden. Without 
revelation, there would be no morality or law (Crone, 2005: 264). 
However, more recent studies have challenged this view and believe that there can 
be found elements that may be linked to natural law, giving reason a role as an 
authority independent of revelation when thinking about the law (Emon, 2005, 2010). 
They link this to the discussion in Islamic theology and legal theory around God’s 
intention with the Sharīʿa (His maqāṣid) and the connected answer that this purpose is 
clearly stated to be the welfare (maṣlaḥa) of the individual or society (Opwis, 2010). 
The issue is what this welfare is grounded in. In simplified terms: everyone agrees 
that what God ordains is good. But is it good because God has ordained it – and if he 
had ordained the opposite, then that would also have been good – or is it good 
because God is good and just, and always does what is best for mankind? In other 
words, does the concept ‘good’ have a meaning outside of (or ‘before’) revelation, a 
logical meaning that can be comprehended by man? 
One element of this discussion is the more theological issue of whether God, in the 
latter case, does good because of His nature, that He as a just god is compelled to do 
the good. This position, promoted by the early current known as the Muʿtazila, was 
rejected by what later became the standard Sunni theology, as it put a restriction on 
God’s omnipotence (Watt, 1998: 180–250). God is indeed good, the later critics said, 
but only because He chose to be so, He could have chosen to be otherwise. This line 
of discussion is of lesser importance to the legal debate, as revelation is what it is (and 
is uniformly good). However, the issue of the maqāṣid of the law was very relevant in 
the field of theory of law, uṣūl al-fiqh. 
The issue can be raised in two contexts. One is inside the legal methodologies to 
discover the legal consequence of a source text, that is within the process of qiyās, 
‘analogy’. There are myriad ways to establish the ‘effective cause’ (ʿilla, or ratio 
legis) of a rule expressed in the Qurʾān or ḥadīth, some more speculative than others. 
Could an evaluation of the common good, maṣlaḥa, be used here to establish what the 
ʿilla might be? One example given by al-Juwaynī (d. 1085) is a marriage contract, 
details of which may or may not be regulated in analogy with commercial contracts 
(Opwis, 2010: 47). However, he says, since a marriage is different from a commercial 
relation, the jurist should instead of direct correspondence with commercial contracts, 
look at the maṣlaḥa result of his answer, which promotes the intention of marriage. In 
other words, social welfare could be a factor in formulating the legal rules within the 
qiyās system. 
Another question is whether maṣlaḥa can be the source for a legal rule when there 
is no text of revelation at all on which to base it, that is in a totally unprecedented case 
outside the qiyās process. That is known as maṣlaḥa mursala, an independent 
maṣlaḥa. This was more controversial. A fairly restrictive use of it was that of Abū 
Ḥamīd al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), who was an important scholar in what became a standard 
theology in Sunnism. He recognized maṣlaḥa as an independent principle, if the result 
without doubt promoted God’s purposes with the Sharīʿa, which he defined as five: 
the protection of religion, life, intellect, family and property (Opwis, 2010: 67). 
However, he also structured these into four levels: necessity (ḍarūra), need (ḥāja), 
improvements and preference. Independent maṣlaḥa may only be used in the first of 
these cases. For example, it is the duty of a father or guardian to provide his children 
with appropriate marriage partners. That is thus a need, but it is not a necessity like 
the duty to provide food and clothing for them. Only the latter is a ḍarūra, necessity 
that qualifies for maṣlaḥa mursala. 
Ghazālī added further restrictions which made this concept less important for him. 
Another theoretician that expanded more on maṣlaḥa was Ibrāhīm al-Shāṭibī (d. 
1388). For him, maṣlaḥa is not restricted to one aspect of legal development alone; it 
is the overall underlying principle of the Sharīʿa, its meaning, maʿnā (Masud, 1995; 
Opwis, 2010: 251). Thus, we must understand that particular rules that may not be 
relevant in each case are still valid because they serve a universal principle of welfare: 
a Muslim may shorten his obligatory prayer when he is on travel. This is so even if 
the travel does not cause any particular hardship for him, because the universal rule of 
shortening the prayer does provide ease for travellers in general (Opwis, 2010: 254). 
Further, al-Shāṭibī accepts that legal rules can be based directly on maṣlaḥa mursala, 
under certain conditions (e.g. that it is necessary to have a rule) and that the mujtahid 
in that case has to consider the outcome of the rule (Opwis, 2010: 315). 
This connects to the question of rights and obligations, which in the uṣūl al-fiqh are 
conceived in two forms: the ḥuqūq al-ʿibād, the rights of man (the worshipper) and 
the ḥuqūq Allāh, the rights of God. Read literally, this seems to be a distinction 
between ‘human rights’ and obligations towards God, but here the language can 
obfuscate the real meaning. There were of course no concepts of individual ‘human 
rights’ in the pre-modern or medieval thinking of Islamic law. All humans belonged 
to categories, and their rights and duties depended on these categories, primarily those 
of Muslim versus unbeliever, man versus woman, and free versus slave. All these had 
rights (the heathen unbeliever possibly excepted), but different rights. More to the 
point, God did not have ‘rights’, because as the creator He had no need of them – God 
does not enter into any contractual relation with His own creation. 
Instead, the concept of God’s rights, ḥuqūq Allāh, must be understood as the 
obligation to fulfil God’s intentions, which was maṣlaḥa, welfare. Thus, God here 
represents God’s will, and ḥuqūq Allāh must be understood as a legal obligation to 
promote public welfare. An interesting aspect of this is that the sultan or other ruler is 
also subservient to this God’s intention, and the idea of ḥuqūq Allāh could be used 
against a sultan who transgressed against the interests of public welfare. The ḥuqūq 
al-ʿibād, on the other hand, represents the individual rights of each person. It was a 
matter of contention which of these rights, those of God, the society at large, or those 
of the individual, would prevail if they came into conflict, but one view was that since 
God has no personal interest in his ‘rights’, He can forgo them, and the rights of the 
individual for redress should therefore trump the public interest if the two were 
opposed (Emon, 2005: 379–390). 
Opening the gates of ijtihād 
One effect of grounding the authority of the madhhab rules in the opinions of the four 
founders, ‘this is what Abū Ḥanīfa said’ (whether or not he actually said it), was a 
basic conservatism in the law. As indicated, legal development never stopped in 
reality, but it was made to appear as if it had stopped with the founders, and that any 
further changes merely filled in gaps left open, in a way they would have originally 
been settled had the founders pronounced on them. This was formulated in the 
expression that the ‘gates to ijtihād are closed’. While this term is often quoted as an 
incontestable fact by modern historians of Islamic law, it was in fact disputed, and 
many later scholars claimed both that legal development could never stop (‘no age 
can be without a mujtahid’, a scholar capable of performing ijtihād) and that they 
themselves had the ability to perform ijtihād (Hallaq, 1984). However, there were 
several levels of ijtihād. Most Muslim scholars agreed that no new schools of law 
beyond the four Sunni ones could be created in this later age. That is what is meant by 
‘completely free ijtihād’, and those gates were closed. But it was possible in later 
times to perform various levels of rule formulation within the madhhab, using the 
established methodology of the madhhab on new situations to create a new rule (a 
high level of ijtihād) or a new modification of an existing rule (Calder, 1996). 
In spite of this opening, and also because many madhhab scholars would try to 
restrict even such limited legal development as much as possible, voices began to be 
heard from the eighteenth century onward for a wider opening, the ‘gates to ijtihād 
can never be closed’. Interestingly, such voices for legal reform often came from the 
peripheries of the Islamic world, starting perhaps with Shah Walī Allāh of India (d. 
1762), followed by Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-Shawkānī of Yemen (d. 1839), Aḥmad ibn 
Idrīs (d. 1837) and his student Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-Sanūsī (d. 1859) of Morocco, 
Yemen and Libya, and others (Peters, 1980). The main argument of these scholars 
was that the Sharīʿa must be based on the sources of revelation and not on the views 
of the school founders or later scholars. 
As the most productive sources for legal discussions were the ḥadīth, they thus 
promoted ḥadīth studies and insisted that a new critical evaluation of ḥadīth could 
bring forth knowledge that had either been lost or was unavailable to the earlier 
scholars. At that time, many orthodox scholars abstained from addressing the ḥadīth 
critically and insisted that only the established fiqh of the early authorities was now a 
fit object of study. Thus, the reformers argued for a return to the original sources of 
revelation. They also tended to be critical of the subsidiary methods of qiyās, human 
analogical reasoning, the importance of which they would reduce to the benefit of 
studies directly on the sources of revelation (Vikør, 2000). 
The term ijtihād has in our time become a mantra for ‘modernizing’ the Sharīʿa. 
The pre-modern scholars who argued for an ‘opening of the gates’ certainly implied 
reform but not in the sense of freely adapting the revealed law to contemporary 
conditions in a free-for-all fashion. On the contrary, they strongly rejected raʾy, 
personal opinion, and indeed considered any legal opinion not properly based on a 
source of revelation as ‘whims’, be that the whims of the early founders or of 
contemporary scholars. Their object was to work on the sources in the same classical 
manner as the early scholars had. What they claimed was that the early scholars, 
including the founding authorities, could not have any precedence over studies done 
later on the same type of sources with the same methodology. The early scholars 
could be wrong, or they could have been unaware of sound ḥadīth that had come to 
light later. Thus, they repeated hagiographical stories for each of the four school 
founders saying, in essence: ‘If you find a ḥadīth that is in opposition to what I have 
said, then leave my opinion and follow the ḥadīth’. 
Thus, these nineteenth-century reformers have been termed la-madhhabī, ‘non-
school’. Indeed some, like Ibn Idrīs mentioned earlier, did express views that would 
indicate that anyone who follows one of the schools is performing shirk, idolatry, 
since he is putting the (human) jurists of the school above God (that is, above any 
ḥadīth that might oppose their school’s view) (Ibn Idrīs, 2000: 47–130). However, in 
most cases, these reformers did generally identify with a school but insisted that a 
scholar must have the right to look above the fences between the schools and see if a 
scholar in another school had found and used a ḥadīth that was more sound than one’s 
own. Thus, what they opposed was taʿaṣṣub al-madhhab, ‘madhhab-fanaticism’, the 
total rejection of any opinion presented by schools other than their own. 
Modernity and the sources of revelation 
The idea of combining views from different schools, talfīq, was not totally unheard of 
earlier either, but did become an important tool for the next generation of reformist 
scholars, who unlike the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century reformists, worked 
under the challenge of new legal ideas from Europe. New laws were enacted, some 
codifying rules based on the Sharīʿa, but without its methodology, others borrowed 
more or less wholesale from European laws (see Chapter 3, this volume). In the 
nineteenth century, the former was most common, but the education of new 
generations of legal experts in the ways of European law led to western-inspired legal 
thinking becoming dominant, even when they worked on those areas of the law that 
were retained as a ‘reservation’ for Sharīʿa rule, such as family and personal status 
law. 
While lawyers in the Muslim world would still receive some training in fiqh, the 
methodology of how to refer to the sources, how to evaluate various views of fiqh 
against each other, and so on, remained generally foreign to the training and thinking 
of twentieth-century lawyers. Thus, modern law makers and lawyers would most 
often refer to the Qurʾān and Sunna either by mimicking traditional texts, or eclecticly 
quote bits from the Qurʾān and Sunna in support of whichever legal view they had 
developed by their own methodology. The development of the law was thus removed 
from the traditional muftis to state legislative bodies. Egypt did introduce the office of 
state mufti in 1895 (the first being the famous modernist Muḥammad ʿAbduh), but it 
soon lost any influence over the legal developments (Skovgaard-Petersen, 1997). 
Thus shorn of their legal competence, the muftis instead became private councillors 
for individual Muslims in matters of ritual or everyday adaptation to the rapidly 
changing technical and social circumstances of the country. 
The new legislators tended to see the gates of ijtihād as wide open, without the 
strict methodology of ḥadīth criticism that had prevailed a century earlier, but 
primarily as a way to adapt the law to the current times. Indeed, the plural, ijtihādāt, 
has come to mean ‘legal development’ in general, while the two terms for legislation, 
tashrīʿ (from the same root as Sharīʿa) and taqnīn (from Kanun, the Ottoman state 
law) has come to be used more or less interchangeably, although the latter more 
specifically means codification. 
With the rise of Islamism and political Islam, in particular from the 1970s, such 
modernity was challenged by political forces that called for the ‘restoration of the 
Sharīʿa’. They, like the modernists, favoured a renewed ijtihād, but here in the 
meaning of discarding the impurities that later tradition had falsely introduced and 
returning to the pure Sharīʿa of the Prophet’s own time, either as an ethic found in 
God’s intentions of maṣlaḥa, or, alternatively by adopting literally any practice of the 
Prophet, in large or small matters, that they believed to be attested in the Sunna (the 
latter trend was known as ‘Salafism’). However, for many, this call for ijtihād was 
more a slogan that should free them from the authority of the traditional scholars, than 
a project of actual legal reform. In most cases, the Islamists focused more on either 
resisting the moral liberalism of modern society, or for the more radical, to reinstate 
the ḥudūd laws as a symbol of ‘pure Sharīʿa’. In neither case did these Islamists tend 
to go deeply into a scholarly discussion of an internal development of the Sharīʿa and 
most often sought scholarly legitimation in citing traditional fiqh, if they at all referred 
to scholarly debates. 
An exemplary case of how these references to Sharīʿa and the sources of revelation 
could be played out in practice, is the story of the Egyptian constitution after 1970. 
Until that time, the law only said that ‘Islam is the religion of the state’ (§3, from 
1956). In 1971, under president Sadat, the phrase ‘and the principles of the Islamic 
Sharīʿa is a main source for legislation’ was added (now §2). In 1980, this was 
strengthened to say that the Sharīʿa was the main source, but still only its ‘principles’. 
This caused considerable controversy, but the decision of what these ‘principles’ were 
and how they were to be applied, was given to the new Constitutional Court, manned 
by professional lawyers with a secular training (Lombardi, 2006). They did test a 
number of new laws against §2 but decided that these principles of the Sharīʿa could 
be either some fixed and undisputed rules, or the maqāṣid, the goals of the Sharīʿa. 
The former, they decided, were quite few, while the latter was the maṣlaḥa, public 
welfare. So, any law that promoted the general welfare of the Egyptian people without 
expressly contravening the few rules they found to be fixed would be acceptable 
under §2, and in the years of its existence, the court only overturned one minor law on 
this ground. 
After the Arab Spring revolution in 2011, a new constitution was again to be made, 
and a constitutional assembly was established with a strong element of Islamists, the 
majority from the ruling Muslim Brotherhood, and a smaller but vocal group by the 
emerging and more conservative Salafi parties (Vikør, 2016). The liberal and secular 
currents successively withdrew from the assembly, leaving it to the Islamists. The 
Salafi groups first attacked §2, which clearly had not worked to strengthen the Sharīʿa 
in actual legal practice. They suggested replacing the word ‘principles’ of the Sharīʿa 
with the ‘rules’ of the Sharīʿa. This was however rejected by the Brotherhood, which 
did not disagree strongly with the prevailing opinion that §2 referred to the maṣlaḥa 
general welfare of Egypt. They did not want to rock this particular boat, so §2 
remained unchanged. 
Instead, the assembly introduced two new paragraphs, both of which were fairly 
ambivalent. One was §4, saying that the religious authorities of al-Azhar, the central 
seat of Islamic learning in Egypt, should ‘be consulted’ in matters of the Sharīʿa. It 
was not clear what this was to mean or whether the intention was to move the 
authority of interpretation from the judiciary to the religious scholars. Even more 
impenetrable was §219, which described how the interpretation was to be done. The 
published English translation did not provide much insight: ‘The principles of Islamic 
Sharia include general evidence, foundational rules, rules of jurisprudence, and 
credible sources accepted in Sunni doctrines and by the larger community’. Some 
deconstruction of the Arabic text may however indicate how a new law was to be 
tested against the Sharīʿa. First, the law should be seen against the undisputed text of 
the Qurʾān and ḥadīth (general rule texts). Then, against the ‘methodologies and 
basics’ of Islamic jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh), and finally against the established rules 
of the four schools of law. It was still not clear how this process was intended to 
work, but it seems to indicate that a fair amount of ijtihād was to be allowed, and that 
new laws of Egypt should be tested directly against the Qurʾān and Sunna, not just 
against the rules of the established schools. 
This was never put to the test, as the military deposed the Islamist government 
soon afterwards and abolished the constitution. The new constitution they 
promulgated soon after retained §2 and allowed al-Azhar a smaller role in questions 
of religion, but not particularly of law. The complicated §219 was removed. Thus, 
Egypt returned to the situation it had been before the revolution in 2011. In all its 
complexity, the exercise indicated one manner in which an attempt was made to 
integrate a traditional religious authority (al-Azhar), new Islamist sensibilities and a 
codified constitution into one text. 
The example from the revolutionary process of Egypt shows how the sources of 
revelation remain relevant, not just as a remote historical text but as a living basis for 
potential legal development. However, since the meaning of these texts has always 
been, and remains, contested, the issue of authority over the sources and over what 
methods of inquiry could be used on them, became central. After the early attempts by 
the caliphs to arrogate this authority to themselves were defeated, the religious 
scholars could dominate the field as the wuratha al-anbiyāʾ, the heirs to the prophets. 
But today they are challenged both by would-be scholars without classical training 
from the independent Islamist circles, and by modernizing state authorities who rely 
as much on western-trained legal experts as on the traditional religious scholars, who 
nevertheless still persist in their promotions of the classical sciences of theology and 
Sharīʿa. 
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